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Katz: Judgements--Res Adjudicata--Effect of Judgement of Justice Court
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
a single corporation may conceal a changed personnel. Suppose X
Bank is appointed executor; if Y Bank now purchases the controlling stock so as to make the former a part of its chain of banks,
the X Bank, although continuing its legal existence, is no longer
the same. Any personal confidence which the testator may have
originally imposed is now fundamentally a negligible consideration.
The writer has been unable to find any West Virginia case
bearing on the question, but the revised codes of both Virginia and
West Virginia expressly adopt the view that the consolidated bank
may qualify as executor.9 These new provisions may be said to
follow the better view, since in neither jurisdiction does the court
have the authority to inquire as to the suitability of the executor,
whether a natural or corporate person.'
-BERNARD SCLOvE.

JUDGMIENTS -

RES

ADJUDICATA -

EFFECT OF JUDG3mENT OF

JUSTICE COURT ON PENDING TORT ACTION IN CIRCUIT COURT. - In
a litigation arising out of an automobile accident between cars
owned by plaintiff and defendant the plaintiff started a suit in
the circuit court and the defendant shortly afterwards started
a suit in the justice of the peace court. The circuit court plaintiff
appeared in the justice court and pleaded to the merits. He did
not advise the justice court of the circuit suit, pending on the
same cause of action. Judgment was given in the sum of $14.77
for the circuit court plaintiff, who thereafter prosecuted his circuit court suit to judgment. On appeal the judgment was reversed for error in disallowing evidence in support of defendant's
pleas of res adjudicata. Johnson v. Rogers.'
This case is unusual because of the unique fact situation and
the problems arising as a result of the decision. Under the rule
of this case the plaintiff, starting a suit in the circuit court, must
appear in the justice court and plead a suit pending in the circuit
court, though the latter was prior in time to the justice action. If
he fails to advise the tribunal of this fact and pleads to the merits,
8W.VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 31, art. 4, § 7, outlines the rights, privileges,
powers and immunities of trust companies and confers the same upon national
banks provisionally, and c. 31, art. 8, § 29, passes the office of trustee or
executor to a consolidated bank whether or not already vested "to same
effect as if the consolidated institution had been named in such deed, will,
eto."' VA. REV. CODE (1930) c. 164a, § 4149(10).
OSee statutes, supra n. 5.
'157 S. E. 409 (W, Va. 1931).
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the determination of the justice is final. An appeal is not possible
here because the sum sued for was less than $15, the appealable
amount.
It is well settled that when a matter is once adjudicated in a
court of competent jurisdiction it is conclusively determined.!
This rule applies to justice proceedings. Davis V. Trump.! Here,
it is true, the action in the circuit court was commenced before
the justice proceeding. But since judgment was first rendered
in the justice court and no plea of suit pending was tendered the
judgment stands.' Although the court in which suit is first begun thereby obtains exclusive jurisdiction in the normal case," a
judgment obtained in another court on the same subject matter
while the first suit is pending and without the jurisdictional
question being pleaded will be conclusive.
The plaintiff could have protected himself by asking for a
stay of proceedings until his other suit was decided. This right
is given by statute.' It is applicable to intermediate and inferior
courts of record as indicated by the revisers note in the Revised
Code. In Dunfee v. Childs' the granting of a stay was held to be
a matter of discretion; but the court in the later case of Keenaa
v. Scott' indicated that if the stay is essential to justice it should
not be denied. This course was open to the circuit court plaintiff
in this case.
The court declared that if the suit in the justice court was
for the purpose of avoiding the circuit court action it would have
been a reprehensible and sharp practice and the result in this
case would have been quite different, adding equivocally, however, that if this was his object the plaintiff would nevertheless
have to preserve his rights by a special appearance. The question
is not discussed further because the court fails to see such a scheme
Ensign Co. v. Carroll, 30 W. Va. 532, 4 S. E. 782 (1887); Lawson v.
Conaway, 37 W. Va. 159, 16 S. E. 564 (1892); LaMotte v. Harper, 88 Ga.
226, 13 S. E. 804 (1891); see collection of cases in 34 C. J. §§ 1285-6.
843 W. Va. 191, 27 S. E. 397 (1897).

'Chicago v. Schendel, Adm'r., 270 U. S. 611, 70 L. Ed. 757 (1926); Casebeer v. Mowry, 55 Pa. 419 (1868); Garden City v. Bank, 65 Kan. 345, 69
Pae. 325 (1902).
5 State v. Fredlock, 52 W. Va. 232, 43 S. E. 153 (1902); Lawson v. Conaway, supra n. 2; McGrew v. Maxwell, 80 W. Va. 722, 94 S. E. 395 (1917);
Whan v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 86 W. Va. 342, 94 S. E. 365 (1917); Toro v.
Shilling, 108 W. Va. 614, 152 S. E. 6 (1930).
8W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 56, art. 6, § 10.
759 W. Va. 225, 53 S. E. 209 (1906).
878 W. Va. 729, 90 S. E. 331 (1916); citing: Katzenstein v. Prager, 67
W. Va. 343, 67 S. E. 792 (1910) ; Scott and Cobb v. Keenan, 69 W. Va. 412,

71 S. E. 570 (1911).
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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
disclosed on the face of the record. This is the colorable point in
the case.
Suppose the
Another question is suggested by this case.
justice of the peace suit is started first for an amount less than
$15. The probable result would be that a $3,000 tort action would
be settled irrevocably in the justice court. It would be impossible
to appeal because of the amount involved. Thus might persons
who are quite certain of their liability find their escape. A race
for jurisdiction might ensue with the party at fault heading for a
justice of the peace court. Such a result is not desirable. Yet
unless we refuse to recognize the justice's judgment as binding
and conclusive it must inevitably follow.
-JEROME KATZ.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-ACCOUNTING FOR PERSONAL PROFITS
MADE BY AGENT WITHHOLDING INFORMATION FROM PRINCIPAL.-

In a recent case,' it was found by the lower court that Crichton was
the agent of Laing when he had a conference with officials of the
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company relative to the purchase of
Laing's stock in the Greenbrier and Eastern Railroad Company
and that the agent's negotiations for and decision to purchase
Laing's 2655 shares for his brothers and other business associates
at $75.00 a share resulted from information received at this conference which he did not disclose to his principal. Crichton, who
then owned some shares of this stock and later secured a number
of shares for corporations in which he was the majority stockholder, gained control of more than 8000 shares, including the
Laing stock and sold the entire amount to the C. & 0. Ry. Co. for
The lower court awarded judgment for the
$140.91 a share.
profit made on the Laing stock, which with interest amounted to
$243,733.10. The appeal to the Supreme Court was limited to
the consideration of the measure and amount of recovery.
On the ground that a fiduciary is strictly prohibited from making a personal profit out of his fiduciary relation aside from the
compensation allowed by law or contract with his principal, and
where he does so, courts of equity will invariably compel him to
account therefor as trustee,2 the upper court ordered Crichton
to account to Laing for all the profits made by him on stock
Laing et al. v. Crichton, 156 S. E. 746 (W. Va. 1931).
The court cites: 15 Am. & ENG. ENCY. LAW, 1199, 1200. Polf. EQ. JURIS.
(4th Ed. 1919) Par. 959; ME= ON AGENcY, (2d Ed. 1914) Pars. 1224,
1225; Robertson v. Chapman, 152 U. S. 673, 681, 14 S. Ct. 741 (1894).
2
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